BY Naimat Ullah
It was a matter of time before the negotiations between Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) and the ruling alliance came to an end. From the very beginning, it was clear to the public that these talks were destined to fail. Both parties, PTI and the government, seemed more inclined to blame each other, making accusations on a daily basis. Each passing day brought new signs of the negotiations’ inevitable collapse. And now, following the instructions of PTI’s founder, Imran Khan, Barrister Gohar Khan, Chairman of PTI, has officially declared the talks over.
According to government negotiation team spokesperson Irfan Siddiqui, PTI had set a seven-day deadline to implement their demands, which would expire on January 28. However, PTI has already declared the negotiations terminated before the deadline. Barrister Gohar confirmed that PTI had given seven days to form a commission consisting of three senior-most Supreme Court judges or High Court judges to review their demands. Failing that, they would walk away from the table.
The debate now revolves around when exactly the seven-day ultimatum was set to end. There was prior discussion on whether a judicial commission could even be formed, and even before that, on when PTI would submit its demands in writing. But these were, in hindsight, trivial discussions. From the outset, many observers believed the talks were unlikely to succeed. Both sides failed to show genuine commitment, and the negotiations were more about point-scoring than resolving issues.
Negotiations typically require a clear agenda, mutual respect, and a willingness to compromise. They are designed to address existing problems, conflicts, or differences. Both sides should engage with a sense of urgency and sincerity, often with a timeline to reach an agreement. Unfortunately, none of these conditions were met. Instead, both parties engaged in theatrical moves, issuing statements but failing to follow through with meaningful actions.
The dynamics of these negotiations were further complicated by the underlying power imbalance. Negotiations are most effective when conducted between parties on equal footing. When one side is stronger, the results are often skewed, and even if an agreement is reached, its long-term impact is questionable. This principle applies not only to international diplomacy but also to internal political negotiations within a country.
When Imran Khan was ousted from office in 2022 through a vote of no confidence, he entered a phase of consistent protest politics. From 1996, when PTI was founded, until 2011, Khan had been involved in resistance politics, challenging the traditional political elites of Pakistan—especially the leadership of the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N). Yet, his voice went largely unheard, and he was often dismissed as a fringe political figure.
It wasn’t until 2011 that Khan gained substantial political traction, largely due to the backing of the military establishment. With this support, his rhetoric against traditional political elites grew more organized and aggressive. By 2018, Khan had risen to power with the help of the same establishment, taking the reins of government at both the provincial and federal levels. But his tenure was marred by poor governance, which resulted in Pakistan’s economy teetering on the brink of default.
In 2022, Khan was removed from office, and since then, he has led a continuous protest movement. He called for public demonstrations six times, and even used his most valuable asset, his wife Bushra Bibi, in the campaign. However, the last major protest on November 26, 2022, failed to achieve its objectives. It was evident that the government’s strategy had neutralized PTI’s ability to mobilize mass protests effectively. The party’s street power, once a formidable force, had been significantly undermined.
Social media remains a powerful tool for PTI, but the government’s countermeasures, such as the introduction of the Pakistan Electronic Crimes Act (PECA), have somewhat limited the party’s ability to freely operate online. PTI has never truly accepted the politicians who are part of the ruling alliance or even those who have allied with the government without joining it officially. When Khan’s party was in opposition before 2018, it was adamant about avoiding any negotiations with the government. However, in a dramatic reversal, PTI found itself at the negotiating table with political figures it had once labeled as corrupt, such as Maulana Fazlur Rehman and the leadership of the Awami National Party (ANP).
This shift was widely seen as a sign of PTI’s defeat. It was a clear indication of the party’s willingness to engage with those it had once vehemently opposed, signaling a failure in its ideological stance. Now, with the collapse of the negotiations, PTI finds itself back in its familiar role of leading street protests and staging rallies. But the question arises: what next for PTI?
For the time being, Barrister Gohar has suggested that if the government were to announce the formation of a judicial commission, PTI might be willing to resume negotiations. However, he also stated that if the government refuses to make this move, PTI could form a grand alliance with other opposition parties and begin a new phase of protest politics. It is clear that PTI is not ready to give up its confrontational approach just yet.
In fact, there are whispers that negotiations are still taking place behind the scenes. The government, facing growing domestic and international pressure, might be forced to give in to some of PTI’s demands. If such a development were to occur, PTI would likely return to the negotiation table. On the other hand, if the talks remain stagnant, PTI will likely turn its attention to the courts or ramp up its street protests once again.
It seems that the government is now in a delicate position. The ruling alliance is facing increasing pressure both domestically and internationally. If PTI’s protests continue, there is a real risk that public unrest will spread to Islamabad and Rawalpindi, putting the government in an untenable situation. However, PTI’s ability to stage a meaningful protest has already been significantly diminished. The government’s strength in managing the opposition’s street power has become apparent.
Should the negotiations fail to progress, PTI will be left with two options: either seek judicial intervention or once again resort to mass protests. The risk of this approach is high, as PTI’s ability to maintain momentum has already been questioned. The political landscape is now so volatile that no one can predict what might happen next. What is clear, however, is that the ruling alliance is reluctant to lose face at the negotiating table, and PTI is unwilling to let the status quo continue.
At this stage, the situation remains fluid. No one can definitively say whether the government will make a concession or whether PTI will find itself on the streets again. The political dynamics in Pakistan are unpredictable, and, as is often the case, the future remains uncertain. What is certain, however, is that the current impasse cannot continue forever. Something will have to give—whether through negotiations, legal challenges, or public unrest. The coming weeks will determine how this political crisis unfolds.
